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July 21, 1959

MEMORANDUM

TO : Mr. Merchant
FROM : Mr. Kearney *RM*
SUBJECT: Tactics on All-German Committee Issue

Gromyko insists that the question of reunification can be discussed only in an all-German committee. We have attacked this position on the ground, inter alia, that all available evidence establishes that such discussions would be fruitless. Gromyko has advanced the position that it is impossible to determine in advance that all-German talks would not produce results. This argument could have some popular appeal.

This Soviet position is subject to a flank attack along the following lines:

We would point out that while the Western Plan contains sound and workable procedures for reunification, neither the Soviets nor their East German advisors have submitted any proposals regarding procedures for reunification. Instead, all they do is talk about German negotiations. There is then no basis on which to claim that all-German discussions could produce anything of value because the East German advisors, while opposing the Western proposals, have not advanced a single constructive suggestion on procedures to achieve reunification.

In such a situation we will hold our position that the East Germans have no real interest or constructive proposals to make respecting reunification.

But, in order to determine whether any possibility exists for a solution of the reunification problem based upon procedures agreed in the two parts of Germany, we suggest that each of the German advisory groups be requested to submit a proposed method of procedure for German reunification. The proposals would be submitted to the Conference by September 1. In the interim, the Conference would proceed to a discussion of the open points regarding Berlin or would recess, whichever the Soviets prefer.

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Reviewed by RMR

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R.D. Kearney : inf

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By	LV
NARS, Date 11/22/82	

A disadvantage in the foregoing proposal is that it infers Western willingness to let reunification be discussed directly by the Germans. If Gromyko indicated any interest in the proposal, he undoubtedly would press on this point and seek to derive a propaganda advantage therefrom, but in response we could stonewall that we are making no commitments whatsoever in the absence of information.


The proposal could also be adapted to serve as an illustration of the manner in which our continuation of the conference proposal would be implemented. In this case, the proposal could be made solely on the basis of acquiring valuable information and without any mention of the all-German committee, thus minimizing the inference mentioned above.

In this form, however, not only would Soviet rejection be automatic, but the move would become a defensive rather than an offensive one.

Copies to: Mr. Reinhardt
Mr. Becker
Mr. Smith
Mr. Hillenbrand
Mr. Toon

RDKearney:imf

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